Traditionally, the definition of zero-knowledge states that an interactive proof of x ∈ L provides zero (additional) knowledge if the view of any polynomial-time verifier can be reconstructed by a polynomial-time simulator. Since this definition only requires that the worst-case running-time of the verifier and simulator are polynomials, zero-knowledge becomes a worst-case notion.
that (for sufficiently large n's) V * i 's running-space in the interaction is n c , while the simulator needs n i space to reconstruct V * i 's view, which is greater than any predetermined polynomial in n c as i tends to infinite. Thus, is it really "indistinguishable" for V * i to interact with the prover or to run the simulator?
The above discussion shows the notion of precise zero-knowledge may be still insufficient and precislization of the definition of zero-knowledge needs further investigation. A natural (and maybe the strongest) avenue for extending precise zero-knowledge is to require that views be reconstructed not only in the same time, but also in the same space. In this paper we will try to pursue this avenue and to construct zero-knowledge proof systems which are precisely simulatable in this sense.
Our Results
We put forward a new notion of precise time and space simulatable zero-knowledge (PTSSZK), which strengthens the notion of precise zero-knowledge [15] by additionally requiring the space used in reconstructing the view of a verifier is also almost the same as that of the verifier in the interaction. Informally, we say a proof system is zero-knowledge with time precision p t (n, y) and space precision p s (n, y) if for every verifier V * the simulator S' running-time and running-space in reconstructing a view are always respectively bounded by p t (n, T) and p s (n, S) whenever V * 's running-time and running-space on this view are respectively T and S.
Since V * and S are usually required to run in polynomial-time, it is less meaningful if p t (n, y) or p s (n, y) is super-polynomial in n or y, or else it is meaningful. To the best of our knowledge, all the known zero-knowledge protocols for languages outside BPP cannot obtain simultaneous meaningful time and space precisions. We construct the first PTSSZK proofs and arguments with simultaneous meaningful time and space precisions for all languages in NP. The formal results are shown as follows. 
there exist ω(log n)-round zero-knowledge arguments with time precision p t (n, y) = poly(n) + poly(n)O(y) and space precision p s (n, y) = poly(n) + O(y) for L.
Comments. We give some comments on our results. 1. We stress that our results are model-independent. (Of course, the precise quantities of the poly(n)s depend on the underlying model.) Although this work concerns the precision of simulation, we are oblivious of the details how machines work and of definitions of the complexity measures of time and space. That is, we don't need to explicitly refer to any concrete machine model and definitions of the complexity measures of the two types of resource in that model. Instead, to handle issues on the measures we simply use variables, say T and S, to denote the quantities of time and space some machine consumes in computation, measured via some unspecified measures in some unspecified model. This abstract handling makes our results hold in general models.
2.
Our precisions are pure in the sense that the simulator S' running-time (resp. running-space) are only related to V * 's running-time T (resp. V * 's running-space S), regardless of S (resp. T). 3. In Theorem 1.1 (or Theorem 1.2), the summand poly(n) in p t depends on both L and the primitives underlying the constructions (e.g. commitments and one-way functions). The coefficient poly(n) in p t (using ω(log n) rounds) is independent of L, but to depend on the primitives. The poly(n) in p s depends on both L and the primitives. We did not try to minimize the poly(n) in p s by letting our simulators employ subtle strategies for space recycling, as our primary interest is just to obtain a fixed polynomial. The constant coefficients in O-notation of p t , p s are independent of both L and the primitives. 4 . We obtain simultaneous linear time precision (using ω(log 3 n) rounds) and linear space precision. Remark 4.7 further shows if we employ the model of (interactive) Turing machines, we can obtain fully linear time precision (using ω(log 3 n) rounds), i.e. p t (n, y) = O(y).
Our Technique. In the high level, our constructions follow the paradigm used in [19] (based on [15] ). To construct precise zero-knowledge protocols, [19] first constructed some proofs (arguments) of knowledge with time precisions of extraction. Then using these proofs of knowledge as tools, [19] showed how to construct the desired precise zero-knowledge protocols with corresponding time precisions of simulation. Thus the task of constructing precise zero-knowledge protocols is reduced to the constructions of the required proofs of knowledge. Following this paradigm, we show if such proofs of knowledge possess simultaneous time and space precisions (of extraction), the zeroknowledge protocols possess corresponding time and space precisions (of simulation). Thus the main technical task in this work is to construct the proofs of knowledge with simultaneous time and space precisions. Technically, [19] constructed the proofs of knowledge with time precisions by using the "cut-off" technique. As aforementioned, the simulators in [19] (as extractor in the proofs of knowledge) in the first run record V * 's (as prover in the proofs of knowledge) running-time (steps) and then in the second run use this time to bound V * 's computing, i.e., they emulate V * for at most such time (steps) and if V * needs more time then they terminate its computing. Since this (original) "cut-off" technique only concerns V * 's running-time, the simulators in [19] cannot automatically provide simultaneous meaningful time and space precisions. Remark 5.2 shows an example that the two types of precision indeed cannot be obtained by using the original "cut-off" technique.
We extend the "cut-off" technique to present an improved extraction strategy and thus construct the proofs of knowledge with simultaneous meaningful time and space precisions. (This shows our simulators use verifiers in the non-black-box way.) To extract secret information our simulators not only record V * 's running-time (steps), but also record its running-space in the first run. In the second run our simulators emulate V * for at most such steps, times a factor, and keep track of V * 's running-space. If V * needs more time, or more space than the recorded space (in size) in the rewind, our simulators terminate its computing. Remark 5.3 shows the usage of the factor for the time in the rewind is necessary, or else our simulator cannot succeed in extraction for any V * . Since there is one more necessary condition with respect to space for our simulators to succeed in extraction, we shall present more subtle probability analysis of successful extraction, which is the main technical novelty of this work.
Outline of This Paper
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we present the preliminaries throughout this paper, which contains probabilistic notations and definitions and known constructions of basic cryptographic primitives. In Section 3, we present the new notion of PTSSZK. In Section 4 we present the high-level proofs of our results assuming the existence of the proofs of knowledge with simultaneous time and space precisions. In Section 5, we present the constructions of the required proofs of knowledge and complete the entire proofs.
Preliminaries

Basic Notations
We use [1, m] to denote all integers in {1, 2, · · · , m}, and use symbol "•" to denote concatenation operation of two strings and use |s| to denote the bit-length of string s. Set Notations. Let A and B be two sets. We use A, B (or AB) to denote the intersection of A and B, A + B to denote the union of A and B if they are disjoint, A − B to denote the difference of A and B, i.e., the set of points that belong to A but not to B,Ā to denote the complement of A. Probabilistic Notations. We follow the standard notations in probability theory. Let Pr 
for all polynomial p(·) and large enough n's). We say a random event happens with overwhelming probability if it happens with probability 1 − µ(n) for some negligible function µ(·). We will sometimes use neg to denote an unspecified negligible function. Definition 2.2. (Computational Indistinguishability) We say two probability ensembles {X n } n∈N and {Y n } n∈N are computationally indistinguishable, if for every family of polynomial-sized circuits
We will sometime abuse the notation and say that X n and Y n are computationally indistinguishable when each of them is a part of {X n } n∈N and {Y n } n∈N and {X n } n∈N and {Y n } n∈N are computationally indistinguishable. We will drop the index n if it can be inferred from the context. In most cases, n is the security parameter.
Commitment Schemes
Definition 2.3. (Perfectly-Binding Commitment) A (non-interactive perfectly binding computationally hiding) commitment scheme is a uniform polynomial-time computable sequence of functions {C n } n∈N where C n : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} p(n) → {0, 1} q(n) , and p(·), q(·) are some polynomials, that satisfies:
Computational Hiding For every x, x ∈ {0, 1} n , the random variables C(x, U n ) and C(x , U n ) are computationally indistinguishable.
A perfectly-binding commitment scheme can be constructed under the assumption that oneway permutations exist [4] (using the generic hard-core bit of [12] ). Another construction, under incomparable assumptions, was given by [2] . We can also use instead the two-round scheme of Naor [16] , which can be based on any one-way function.
Perfectly-Hiding Commitment Schemes. In a perfectly-hiding commitment scheme, the binding property is guaranteed to hold only with respect to a probabilistic polynomial-time sender. On the other hand, the hiding property is information-theoretic. That is, the distributions of commitments different strings are identical, and thus even an all powerful receiver cannot know the value committed to by the sender. We stress that the binding property guarantees that a cheating probabilistic polynomial-time sender can find only one decommitment, even though decommitments to different strings exist. See [11] (Sec. 4.8.2) for a full definition. Perfectly-hiding commitment schemes can be constructed from any one-way permutation [17] . Constant-round schemes are only known to exist under stronger assumptions of the existence of collision-resistant hash functions [18] [7] or the existence of a collection of certified claw-free functions [11] (Sec. 4.8.2.3).
Interactive Proofs and Arguments
An interactive proof [14] is a two-party protocol, where one party is called the prover and the other party is called the verifier. We use the following definition: Definition 2.4. An interactive protocol (P, V ) is called an interactive proof system for a language L if the following conditions hold: Efficiency: The number and total length of messages exchanged between P and V are polynomially bounded and V is a probabilistic polynomial-time machine.
∈ L, then for any cheating prover P * the probability that P * convinces V of x is neg(n).
Let L be a NP language. An interactive argument for L [6] is the following variation on the definition of an interactive proof: 1. The soundness requirement is relaxed to quantify only over prover strategies P * that can be implemented by a polynomial-sized circuit. 2. The system is required to have an efficient prover strategy.
Zero-Knowledge
Informally, a proof or argument system for L is zero-knowledge [14] if after seeing a proof that x ∈ L, the verifier does not learn anything about x that it didn't know before. Moreover this holds even if the verifier does not follow its prescribed strategy for the proof system, as long as its strategy can be implemented by an efficient algorithm. The formal definition is below:
be some language and let (P, V ) be an interactive proof (argument) for L. We say (P, V ) is (perfect) zero-knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, called simulator, such that for every polynomial-sized circuit V * and every (x, w) ∈ R, the following two probability variables are (identically distributed) computationally indistinguishable: 1. The view of V * in the real execution of (P (w), V * )(x). 2. The output of the simulator on input (x, V * ).
There are two classical constructions of 3-round zero-knowledge proofs for NP (without requiring negligible soundness error probability) which are Blum's proof for Hamilton Circuits (HC) [5] and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson's proof for Graph 3-Coloring [13] . These two constructions use a common paradigm. That is, the proofs consist of three steps: Prover firstly sends a commitment (using a perfectly-binding commitment scheme) to verifier and then verifier responses a random challenge (For Blum's protocol, the challenge is one bit). Lastly, prover answers the challenge by sending the decommitment. Verifier accepts the proof if the decommitment is valid.
Witness Indistinguishability
Witness indistinguishability (WI) is a weaker property than zero-knowledge, introduced by [9] . In a witness indistinguishable proof system if both w 1 and w 2 are witnesses that x ∈ L, then it is infeasible for the verifier to distinguish whether the prover used w 1 or w 2 as the auxiliary input. The formal definition is below:
be some language and (P, V ) be a proof (argument) for L. We say that (P, V ) is witness indistinguishable if for any polynomial-sized circuit family {V * n } n∈N , any x, w 1 , w 2 where (x, w 1 ) ∈ R and (x, w 2 ) ∈ R such that the view of V * in the interacting with P (x, w 1 ) is computationally indistinguishable from the view of V * in the interacting with P (x, w 2 ). [9] showed that WI property can be preserved in concurrent setting. Hence n parallel composition of Blum's proof for NP is a construction of WI proofs for NP with negligible soundness error probability.
Proofs of Knowledge
In a proof/argument system, the prover convinces the verifier that some string x is a member of a language L. In a proof/argument of knowledge (POK/AOK) [8] [3] [14] [20] the prover should convince the verifier that it also knows a witness to the fact that x ∈ L. This is formalized by requiring that if the verifier is convinced with some probability p by some (possibly cheating) prover strategy, then by applying an efficient algorithm, called knowledge extractor, to the cheating prover's strategy and private inputs, it is possible to obtain a witness to the fact that x ∈ L, with probability (almost equal to) p . The formal definition is below:
and let (P, V ) be a proof (argument) system for L. We say that (P, V ) is a proof (argument) of knowledge for L if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm E (called the knowledge extractor) such that for every polynomial-sized prover P * and for every x ∈ {0, 1} n , if we let p denote the probability that V accepts x when interacting with
Instantiated with a perfectly-binding (resp. perfectly-hiding) commitment scheme, the n parallel executions of Blum's protocol is a (resp. perfectly) WI POK (resp. AOK), ensured by the special soundness property.
The New Notion
Counting Time and Space. If M is a probabilistic (non-interactive) machine, denote by M r the deterministic one obtained by fixing M 's random coins to r, by T Mr(x) and S Mr(x) the runningtime and running-space of M r on input x. (As aforementioned, we herein don't explicitly refer to any machine model and definitions of the complexity measures of running-time and running-space. Each of general models and the appropriate definitions of the complexity measures in it are suitable for this paper.) Assume (P, V ) uses κ-round prover's messages. For any interactive machine V * with auxiliary input z (w.l.o.g. assume V * is deterministic), denote by v = (x, z, (m 1 , m 2 , ..., m κ )) the view of V * . Then denote by T V * (v) and by S V * (v) the running-time and running-space of V * on input x and letting the j th message received be m j , 1 ≤ j ≤ κ. For convenience of statement, we will always consider V * to have x, z hardwired and refer the view of V * to (m 1 , m 2 , ..., m κ ) in the rest of this paper (similarly for any P * ).
We say that (P, V ) is computational zero-knowledge, or just zero-knowledge, with time precision p t and space precision p s if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S, called precise simulator, such that for every polynomial-sized V * and every {(x, w)} ∈ R the following conditions hold: 1. The output of S(x, V * ) is computationally indistinguishable from the view of V * in an execution of (P (w), V * )(x). 2. For every sufficiently long r ∈ {0, 1} * , let v be the view generated by
Remark 3.2. If we only require the running-time of S and V * satisfy the constraint p t (n, y), regardless of the constraint p s (n, y) for their running-space, this is essentially the definition of precise zero-knowledge given in [15] .
It can be seen a main task of constructing a PTSSZK protocol is to construct a precise simulator S. To output a simulated view, S usually needs to invoke an interaction in which it acts as prover on one hand and emulates V * to output verifier's messages on the other hand. To make the analysis of S' running-space accurately, we make the following specifications on the decomposition of running-space of S when emulating V * (which are quite general). Specifications. For our simulator S, S Sr(x,V * ) consists of three parts: (1) the space needed to emulate V * , (2) the predetermined space (decided by the protocol) needed to store the communicated messages (notice that V * 's computation is emulated by S and thus if S detects V * tries to send a message longer than what the protocol specifies it aborts) and (3) the space needed to perform the prover's strategy and extraction etc. Time and Space Cost in Emulation. For universal machine S, we assume there are two universal constants l 1 , l 2 satisfying that the time taken by S in emulating V * on view v is l 1 T V * (v) [15] , and the space taken by S in emulating V * on v (i.e. part 1 described in the previous paragraph) is l 2 S V * (v).
High-Level Proofs of Our Results
In this and next section we prove Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2. This section only presents the highlevel constructions of the desired protocols. To do this we present a new primitive in Section 4.1, called precise time and space emulatable proofs/arguments of knowledge (PTSEPOK/PTSEAOK). In Section 4.2, we present the PTSSZK proofs and arguments under the assumption of the existence of the PTSEPOKs and PTSEAOKs. In Section 5 we will present the detailed constructions of the required PTSEPOKs and PTSEAOKs and thus complete the entire proofs.
PTSEPOKs and PTSEAOKs
The notion of PTSEPOKs and PTSEAOKs captures the idea that for any prover P * and any x, (1) the joint view of P * and the honest verifier V and (2) the witness for x ∈ L whenever V 's view is accepting, can be simultaneously reconstructed (by an algorithm, called emulator-extractor) in the time and space almost identical to those taken by P * on the reconstructed view. The formal description is shown as follows.
for L, p t : N ×N → N and p s : N ×N → N be two monotonically increasing 2-variate functions. We Public Input: x ∈ {0, 1} n (statement to be proved is "x ∈ L"). Auxiliary Input to Prover: w, a witness for x ∈ L.
, 1} poly(n) and sends c = Com(σ; s). V → P : V proves to P via the perfectly WI PTSEAOK of the statement: there exist values σ and s such that c = Com(σ; s).
Stage 2: P → V : P proves to V in the (slightly modified) n parallel repetitions of Blum's proof [5] that x ∈ L, in which V opens c and uses the string σ as its challenge.
Protocol 4.4. The PTSSZK proof for L.
say (P, V ) is a proof (argument) of knowledge with time precision p t and space precision p s if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm E, called precise emulator-extractor, satisfying that for every polynomial-sized prover P * and for every x ∈ {0, 1} n the following conditions hold:
is identically distributed to the joint view in the interaction of (P * , V )(x). Further, if with non-negligible probability p view V is a convincing view, then w is a witness for x ∈ L with probability p − neg(n).
For every sufficiently long
and
Remark 4.2. To be a building block of our PTSSZK protocols, a PTSEPOK (or PTSEAOK) (P, V ) should have one more property, i.e. (perfect) WI. That is, (P, V ) should additionally satisfy that for every polynomial-sized V * and for every x, w 1 , w 2 where (x, w 1 ) ∈ R and (x, w 2 ) ∈ R V * 's view in the interacting with P (x, w 1 ) is (identical to) computationally indistinguishable from its view in the interacting with P (x, w 2 ).
The Constructions Claim 4.3. Assume there exist constant-round perfectly-hiding commitments and m -round perfectly WI PTSEAOKs with time precision poly(n) + O(y) (resp. poly(n) + O(ny)) and space precision poly(n) + O(y) for each NP relation. Then for every language L ∈ NP, there exists an m + O(1)-round zero-knowledge proof with time precision
Proof. Our protocol is depicted in Protocol 4.4 where Com is a constant-round perfectly-hiding commitment. We show the protocol has all the required properties.
Completeness and Soundness. First, it is obvious completeness holds. Second, by perfect WI of the PTSEAOK, it holds that the whole stage 1 is still a perfectly-hiding commitment. Thus we deduce that when reaching stage 2 the prover has no idea about the value of challenge σ. In other words, even though the cheating prover reaches the second stage after seeing all messages in the first stage, the messages in the second stage are independent of the verifier's messages in stage 1. So a cheating prover violating the soundness of our protocol can be transformed to a full power cheating prover violating the soundness of the n parallel executions of Blum's proof. Thus soundness holds.
Simulator S. For every polynomial-sized V * and x ∈ L, S works as follows: It first emulates V * to the commitment c. Running-Time. By the time precision of the PTSEAOK, it takes S at most poly(n) + O(T) time (resp. poly(n) + poly(n)O(T), where the latter poly(n) is |c|) to finish the simulation of stage 1. In stage 2 it takes S a poly(n) time to perform the honest prover's strategy and O(T) time to emulate V * . Consequently, there is a p t (n, y) as required satisfying S' running-time is bounded by p t (n, T).
Running-Space. By the space precision of the PTSEAOK, S' running-space in stage 1 is less than poly(n) + O(S) (this poly(n) is within |(view V * 1 , view P 1 , (σ, s)| + poly(|c|), where the latter poly is that one in the space precision of the PTSEAOK). Second, S' running-space in stage 2 is less than poly(n) + O(S) (this poly(n) denotes the space needed to perform the honest prover's strategy and store the view of stage 2). Consequently, there is a p s (n, y) as required satisfying S' running-space is bounded by p s (n, S). The claim follows. Proof. Our protocol is shown in Protocol 4.6, where f is a one-way function. Since it is an instantiation of Feige and Shamir's protocol [10] , completeness and computational soundness hold. The simulator S works in almost the same way described in the previous proof. The difference is that what S obtains by running E in stage 1 is r 1 or r 2 and then S uses r 1 or r 2 as a witness for the combined statement to finish the interaction of stage 2. The desired time and space precisions are also satisfied by using the same analysis in the previous proof. Lastly, we know the view output by E is identical to that of stage 1 in the real interaction, and the protocol in stage 2 is WI. Then S' output is computationally indistinguishable from the real view of V * . The claim follows.
Remark 4.7. If we use (interactive) Turing machines as the underlying model, better time precisions can be obtained, i.e. p t (n, y) = O(y) (resp. p t (n, y) = poly(n)O(y)), only with a slightly modification introduced by [15] on the above constructions. That is, we add a step in the beginning of the protocols, i.e., V sends 1 W (n) to P , where W (n) is a polynomial bound on the summand poly(n) in p t ; then P verifies that V sent a string of length W (n) and if not it aborts. In the model of interactive Turing machines (refer to [11] , Sec 4.2.), writing/reading a string of length W (n) to/from the communication tapes needs time at least W (n), which results in T ≥ W (n). Verifying the validity of the 1-string costs O(W (n)) = O(T) time. Thus the p t (n, y) can be expressed as O(y) (resp. p t (n, y) = poly(n)O(y)).
Public Input: x ∈ {0, 1} n (statement to be proved is "x ∈ L"). Auxiliary Input to Prover: w, a witness for x ∈ L.
Stage 1: V → P : V chooses r 1 , r 2 ∈ R {0, 1} n and sends In the high-level proofs, many details of S are hidden in E. In next section we will construct the required PTSEPOKs and PTSEAOKs, in which the key task is to present all the details of E.
Constructions of the PTSEPOKs and PTSEAOKs
This section is devoted to the constructions of the required PTSEPOKs and PTSEAOKs. The emphasis is the probability analysis of successful extraction of E. (Since it is actually a partial strategy of S, E also follows the specifications on running-space shown in Section 3). We illustrate the constructions of the PTSEPOKs in detail and then show the PTSEAOKs can be obtained similarly. We also show two remarks on E's extraction strategy and its comparison with the original "cut-off" technique in [19] .
Claim 5.1. Assume there exist one-way functions. Then for each NP relation R there exists an ω(log 3 n)-round WI PTSEPOK with time precision p t (n, y) = poly(n) + O(y) and space precision p s (n, y) = poly(n) + O(y) for R.
Proof. Instantiate the commitment scheme in Blum's proof for R with a constant-round perfectlybinding commitment scheme. This proof is special-sound in the sense that there is a polynomialtime algorithm, denoted Ex R , which given the public input x and two different valid transcripts w.r.t. a common commitment can compute a witness w for x. We call the n parallel repetitions of this proof the atomic protocol. Let (P, V ) denote the m = ω(log 3 n) sequential repetitions of the atomic protocol, in each of which P proves to V the knowledge of a witness for x. We will show (P, V ) is a WI PTSEPOK with the required properties. It can be seen that completeness and soundness hold and WI is preserved. Thus we only need to construct a precise emulator-extractor E for (P, V ), as the following shows.
The Construction of E. For any polynomial-sized (deterministic) P * (we only need to consider polynomial-sized provers) and x, and for each i ∈ {1, · · · , m}:
Step i.1. E adopts the honest verifier's strategy to interact with P * in the i th atomic protocol to output the joint view (this is the first run, used to gather the joint view), and at the same time records P * 's running-time and running-space. If P * sends an invalid message in this atomic protocol, E halts outputting ⊥. Otherwise let r i denote E's challenge in this atomic protocol, v i denote the current prover's view prior to r i (exclusive). Let t i denote P * 's running-time in computing the response on receiving r i , s i denote (the size of) P * 's running-space on view v i • r i .
Step i.2. If the witness has not been extracted, E performs the extraction (this is the second run only for extraction). It rewinds P * to the point where r i is supposed to be sent, and chooses a new challenge r i ∈ R {0, 1} n and sends r i to P * , and recycles the space used in emulating P * of the previous rewinds. It emulates P * for at most 2t i steps, and at the same time keeps track of P * 's running-space on view v i • r i and checks whether it is within s i . If P * can output a response to r i within 2t i time and its running-space on v i • r i is within s i , E computes a witness w by running Ex R (in the case that the response is valid and r i = r i or else E proceeds to next atomic protocol). Otherwise, E cuts off P * 's computing and proceeds to next atomic protocol. (If i = m, E performs the extraction and halts outputting w if it has been extracted.) Properties of E. Let (view P * , view V ) be the joint view output by E. By E's strategy in the first run, we have (view P * , view V ) is identical to the joint view in a real interaction of (P * , V )(x). Let T and S denote the running-time and running-space of P * on view P * respectively. Hence we only need to show E has the following properties. Running-Time. Since P * 's running-time in the rewind of the i th atomic protocol is at most 2t i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, P * 's running-time in all rewind runs is no more than 2 · i∈ [1,m] t i < 2T. Then it takes E O(T) time to emulate P * in the entire simulation. Further, sending prover's messages, checking if a transcript is accepting, and extracting a witness for two accepting transcripts, can be done in a fixed polynomial time. Thus E's running-time is bounded by poly(n) + O(T). Running-Space. First, it takes E O(S) space to emulate P * 's computing on view P * . Second, by the recycling strategy, it also takes E O(S) space to emulate all P * 's computing on v i • r i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Third, besides emulating P * , E needs a more fixed polynomial space to carry out other computing and store the joint view. Thus E's running-space is bounded by poly(n) + O(S). Extractable Probability. Let Accept (resp. Reject) denote the event that view V is an accepting (resp. rejective) view. Let Before proceeding to Claim 5.4, we show two remarks on E's extraction strategy and its comparison with the original "cut-off" technique in [19] . If we modify E by only requiring it cuts off P * 's computing in the second run of each atomic protocol iff P * cannot output a response to r i within t i time, then this is the original "cut-off" technique. Notice that there are two differences between it and the extraction strategy herein. The main difference is that E herein uses the "cutoff" technique by simultaneously considering P * 's running-time and running-space instead of P * 's running-time alone. Another difference is that E herein allows P * to run 2t i time at most in the second run instead of t i time. In Remark 5.2, we show the original "cut-off" technique cannot obtain simultaneous meaningful time and space precisions. In Remark 5.3, we show the time for P * to run in the second run cannot be reduced to t i (if we require that the space for it to run is at most s i ). That is, it is necessary for E to allow P * to run t i times a factor (e.g. 2) steps in the second run.
Remark 5.2. We now show if E adopts the original "cut-off" technique, although it can of course obtain linear time precision it cannot obtain any meaningful space precision. To this end we need to show for any meaningful p s (n, y) there exists a P * satisfying E's running-space is more than p s (n, S) with non-negligible probability (even if m can be any arbitrary polynomial).
First consider a prover P defined below. P proceeds just as the honest prover P , except that P receives a random 2-wise independent hash function h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n as the auxiliary input. Let Q(n) be a polynomial bound on the running-space of P . Then in the 1 st atomic protocol on receiving a challenge (r 1 or r 1 ) P applies h to this challenge and generates a random string a. If the first log n bits of a are not zeros, P executes some instructions to consume p s (n, Q(n)) 2 more space. Otherwise, it also executes some dummy instructions to consume the same time but no more space. Then, it proceeds to do what P would on a challenge and also executes some instructions (which don't consume any more space), if needed, to adjust its running-time in this step to be same in answering different challenges. In all the residual atomic protocols, P behaves identically to P .
In the 1 st atomic protocol, since P 's running-time on different challenges are always identical, there is no possibility for E to cut off P 's computing in the second run and thus the extraction always succeeds in case r 1 = r 1 . However, it can be seen the event that P 's running-space on view v 1 • r 1 is less than Q(n) and its running-space on view v 1 • r 1 is at least p s (n, Q(n)) 2 occurs with probability
. Thus E's running-space is more than p s (n, S) with probability at least
By an averaging argument, there exists at least one auxiliary input z = h resulting in the event occurs with that probability. Let P * be P having z hardwired and then P * is the desired one.
Remark 5.3. Now we show the factor (i.e. 2) for t i in E's strategy in the second run cannot be eliminated. That is, we show if we bound the time and space for a prover to run in the second run are respectively t i and s i , then there exists a P * such that E fails in extraction with non-negligible probability even if m can be any arbitrary polynomial.
Consider a prover P * defined below. P * proceeds just as P , except that the following differences. According to P * 's running-time and running-space, all the N = 2 n challenges in {0, 1} n can be divided into n c 0 > m disjoint classes, ordered in an arbitrary way, each of which has N n c 0 challenges, such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ m when executing the i th atomic protocol (the view prior to this atomic protocol is then fixed): 1. besides doing what P would, P * also executes some instructions to ensure its running-time (resp. running-space) on any of the challenges (resp. the generated view concatenated with any of the challenges) from the same class are identical; 2. if denote by t (j) i (resp. s (j) i ) P * 's running-time (resp. running-space) on any challenge (resp. the generated view concatenated with any challenge) from the j th class, then t
Hence for each i a sufficient condition for the extraction to fail in the i th atomic protocol is that r i and r i are chosen from two different classes, which occurs with probability n c 0 · Proof. If there exists an i satisfying that the extraction always succeeds in the first i atomic protocols for all outcomes of E's coins used in the first and second runs of these protocols, the claim of course holds. Thus in the following we prove this claim by assuming for all i's there are some outcomes of the E's coins resulting in the extraction fails in the first i atomic protocols.
Fix any outcome of such E's coins that result in the extraction fails in the first i − 1 atomic protocols. Let us analyze the probability of successful extraction in the i th atomic protocol. We will present a uniform lower bound for this probability when further fixing any outcome of E's coins used in this atomic protocol before sending the challenge (r i ). (Thus view v i is determined.) In the case P * outputs an invalid message on view v i , the probability of successful extraction is 1. Thus we only need to consider the case the extraction can reach the step E sends the challenge as follows.
We first (re)highlight some crucial random variables. Let r i (resp. r i ) denote the random challenge in {0, 1} n sent to P * in the first (resp. second) run. Let t i (resp. t i ) denote P * 's runningtime in answering r i (resp. r i ) in the first (resp. second) run. Let s i (resp. s i ) denote (the size of) P * 's running-space on view v i • r i (resp. v i • r i ). Since coins E uses are independent, we have that r i and r i are independently identically distributed (i.i.d.), t i and t i are i.i.d., s i and s i are i.i.d. .
If P * outputs a valid response to r i in the first run, a necessary and sufficient condition for the extraction to succeed is that s i ≤ s i , t i ≤ 2t i , r i = r i and P * can output a valid response to r i in the second run. Otherwise, the extraction is regarded as successful. If we set t i , s i (resp. t i , s i ) the values that are respectively greater than 2 times P * 's maximal running-time and P * 's maximal running-space when P * outputs an invalid response in the first (resp. second) run, then in the former case the necessary and sufficient condition can be reduced to s i ≤ s i , t i ≤ 2t i , r i = r i and in the latter case s i ≤ s i , t i ≤ 2t i can be satisfied too. This means s i ≤ s i , t i ≤ 2t i , r i = r i can be used as a uniform sufficient condition for the extraction to succeed.
Thus assuming P * 's running-time and running-space are bounded by if P * outputs an invalid response in the first (resp. second) run. Hence, by the analysis in the above paragraph, the probability the extraction succeeds is at least Pr[
Thus, our main task in this proof is to present a lower bound for this probability. Notations and Variables. We define the following notations and variables.
(1) We use t(u) to denote the value of t i when the challenge to P * is u ∈ {0, 1} n in the first run.
(Equivalently, t(u) is the value of t i when the challenge to P * is u in the second run.) We order the N = 2 n challenges in {0, 1} n as u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u N in an arbitrary way only if this order
. We also write u 1 < u 2 < · · · < u N by this order, and say u 1 is less than u 2 , u 2 is less than u 3 and so on. Then when we say "choose the minimal challenge from set U ⊂ {0, 1} n , denoted u" we mean the chosen u ∈ U is less than any one in
For each u k , we define N k as the cardinal number of the set {u ∈ {0, 1} n :
Assume there is a k 0 satisfying We first show what D 1 is. Choose the minimal challenge from {0, 13 ≤ N , and proceed. Since {0, 1} n is finite, using this selection method we can finally obtain a sequence of challenges {u 
If D 1 equals the sample space, the decomposition has only one element D 1 . Otherwise, we need to construct D 2 by using the similar way in constructing D 1 . Choose the minimal challenge from {0,
1 , continue this selection. Finally, using this selection method we obtain a sequence of challenges {u
As
. Then in the same way,
We now turn to describe the general case. Assume we have constructed 
Since the sample space is finite, the construction of the decomposition will halt certainly. Namely, there is a number H satisfying h∈ [1,H] D h contains the sample space. Thus the desired de-
Consequently, by the formula of total probability, [1, H] 
In the last step of the above formula, we use the fact
. This is because
us evaluate the second item at the right hand of the last equal sign in the above formula. Since N k hK h < δN (by the assumption of Case 2), N k hK h d h < δd h N < cδ log nN . Let γ denote cδ log n and then γ(n) = o (1) .
The second item = h∈ [1, H] 1
Denote by H the largest integer satisfying
c log n N + 1. Thus (for sufficiently large n's),
Combining the results of Cases 1 and 2 (and the case the extraction cannot reach the step E sends r i ), we conclude that for any outcome of E's coins used in the i th atomic protocol prior to r i the extraction succeeds with probability at least 1 2 δ 2 − 2 −n . This means the extraction succeeds in this atomic protocol with probability at least 1 2 δ 2 − 2 −n . Namely, the extraction fails with probability at most 1 − Proof. The desired protocol (P, V ) and E are constructed in almost the same way as those in the proof of Claim 5.1, except for two differences. One is m = ω(log n) herein. The other is E's extraction strategy in the second run. In the extraction of the i th atomic protocol, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, E chooses a new challenge r i ∈ R {0, 1} n and sends r i to P * , and recycles the space used in the previous rewinds. The difference is that in the second run E emulates P * for at most nt i steps. E does not cut off P * 's computing iff P * can finish the computing within nt i time and its running-space on v i • r i is no more than s i . Others remain unchanged. We can show that E has all the required properties using a similar analysis.
Let (view P * , view V ) denote the joint view output by E. It is clear that (view P * , view V ) is identical to the real view in the interaction of (P * , V )(x). Further, by applying the analysis in the proof of Claim 5.1, we have that E can provide time precision poly(n) + O(ny) and space precision poly(n) + O(y). Thus, all that is left to prove is that E succeeds in extraction with overwhelming probability, which can be shown by using the method in the proof of Claim 5.4.
Fix any outcome of E's coins used in the first and second runs of the first i − 1 atomic protocols that results in E's view in the first run of these protocols is accepting and the extraction fails. Let us analyze the probability of successful extraction in the i th atomic protocol. We will also present a uniform lower bound for this probability when further fixing any outcome of E's coins used in this atomic protocol prior to sending the challenge. (Thus view v i is determined.) In the same way, we only need to consider the case the extraction can reach the step E sends r i as follows.
Assuming P * 's running-time and running-space are bounded by n c−2 −1 for some non-predetermined constant c > 0 (for sufficiently large n's), we set t i = n c−1 − 1 and s i = n c−2 (resp. t i = n c−1 − 1 and s i = n c−2 ) if P * outputs an invalid response in the first (resp. second) run. Hence, by the similar analysis in the proof of Claim 5. Combining the results from Cases 1 and 2 (and the case the extraction cannot reach the step E sends r i ) we conclude that for any outcome of E's coins used in the i th atomic protocol prior to r i E succeeds in extraction in the i th atomic protocol with probability at least 1 2 δ 2 − 2 −n . This means the extraction succeeds in this atomic protocol with probability at least 1 2 δ 2 − 2 −n . Namely, E fails with probability at most 1 − 
